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This article traces the contours of Pascal’s inﬂuence on Tocqueville’s understanding of
the human condition and our appropriate response to it. Similar temperaments lead both
authors to emphasize human limitations and contingency, especially our mortality, our
ignorance of the most important subjects, and the effects of historical contingency on
human nature, and both represent the complex internal dynamic of human nature in
terms of the interplay of “angel” and “brute.” They disagree over the power and sig-
niﬁcance of human action. Whereas the motif of human weakness is fundamental for
Pascal, Tocqueville repeatedly afﬁrms that, under the right conditions, human beings
are “powerful and free.” Beginning from Pascalian premises, and endeavoring to be
more faithful to some of those premises than Pascal himself was, Tocqueville aims to
illuminate the possibility of an amelioration of the human condition through a “new
political science” that redeems the political realm without divinizing it.
Most students of Tocqueville know of his remark, “There are three men with
whom I live a little every day; they are Pascal, Montesquieu, and Rousseau.”1
Pascal is considered a religious rather than a political philosopher and is not
often invoked in discussions of politics, so the inﬂuence of the other two is
more obvious andmore widely commented on. Yet Pascal’s inﬂuence is as pro-
found as theirs, and although Tocqueville made a careful study of Pascal’s ele-
gant yet natural literary style, it is not merely stylistic.2 When we examine
Tocqueville’s understanding of human existence and seek to get a sense of
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what we might call his own “religious sensibility” and his conception of the
shape and limitations of human life, we constantly ﬁnd him wrestling with
Pascal, dialectically engaged with Pascal’s arguments and positions, and de-
veloping his own more social, more historical, and more political conception
of the human condition.
Since Diez del Corral’s “Tocqueville et Pascal,” there have been several
attempts to understand Pascal’s inﬂuence on Tocqueville (Corral 1965). The
new critical edition of Democracy in America edited by Eduardo Nolla and
translated by James Schleifer is helpful in making some of the most patent
connections clear to the reader. Themost notable and sustained of these studies
is Peter Lawler’s The Restless Mind: Alexis de Tocqueville on the Origin and
Perpetuation of Human Liberty, to which my account owes something, but
I regard his book as making Tocqueville too indebted to Pascal and not do-
ing justice to the social and political aspects of Tocqueville’s thought. By and
large, however, Tocqueville scholarship has not made much of Pascalian in-
ﬂuence, and so readersmaywonder just towhat extent the seventeenth-century
scientist, Jansenist, and polemicist shaped the convictions of the nineteenth-
century statesman and political theorist.
Fundamentally, what Tocqueville and Pascal share is a temperament open
to certain experiences of the sublime, on the one hand, and aware of human
limitations and contingency, on the other. This temperament leads them to
endorse similar kinds of principles, although they do not always interpret the
same experiences in the same way and do not always draw the same con-
clusions from them. My goal here is to identify the exact points on which
Tocqueville and Pascal agree or disagree regarding the human condition and
thereby to illuminate why they draw different conclusions on that subject.
On a wide number of points regarding the importance of mortality, igno-
rance, and the structure of human nature, there is signiﬁcant agreement be-
tween the two thinkers. I shall discuss each of these points in what follows.
Moreover, one great difference between Pascal and Tocqueville grows out of
a point of agreement. Both believe that what different people count as “hu-
man nature” and as “justice” at any given time is heavily inﬂuenced by custom
and history. Pascal addresses such themes in a variety of ways, and in frag-
ment 159 he toys with the radically historicist idea that, our true nature having
been lost in the Fall, we are now custom all the way down. Pascal’s reﬂections
on the power of custom to shape human sentiments and behavior, however,
Pascal for the very depth of the language, to Voltaire for the ease and the art of lightening the
style.”
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are not developed in a systematic way. Tocqueville, on the other hand, treats
the historical malleability of human nature as one of his primary problem-
atics. His science of social state functions to unify the “two distinct humani-
ties” of “democratic man” and “aristocratic man” and to subject such his-
toricism to a rule (Democracy in America 2.4.8; Tocqueville 2010, 1282; see
also Zuckert 1993; Jech 2013).3 His thought is therefore more social and
more political than Pascal’s.
The most important difference between them concerns their relative esti-
mates of human power and the signiﬁcance of human action. The motif of hu-
man weakness is an important part of Pascal’s analysis of the human condi-
tion. “What astonishes us most,” Pascal says, “is that everyone is not more
astonished at his own weakness” (frag. 67). One ﬁnds Pascal returning to this
theme in fragments 62, 67, 130, 182, 184, 240, 249, 540, and 643, among
others. Human action is incapable of ameliorating the afﬂictions associated
with the human condition and is engaged in primarily as a means of avoiding
honestly facing those afﬂictions. For Pascal, action is frequently no more than
a form of distraction or diversion (frags. 168 and 171); it is as if humanity
dwelled in a doomed valley, afﬂicted by severe and crippling ills that will even-
tually destroy us, while our only cures lay beyond the impassable peaks clos-
ing us in. To solve the human condition would require transcending it, a task
that requires equally transcendent power.
Tocqueville, on the other hand, repeatedly afﬁrms that, under the right
conditions, human beings are (in a turn of phrase one cannot imagine ﬁnd-
ing in Pascal) “powerful and free” (2.4.8, Tocqueville 2010, 1285). Despite
agreeing with Pascal that human greatness lies entirely “in the soul,” he mod-
iﬁes this idea so that its signiﬁcance is that human greatness is especially pres-
ent in action. Tocqueville arrives at this conclusion from Pascalian premises. In
fact, in a crucial respect, he makes these premises more internally consistent
than Pascal had done. Without denying Pascal’s otherworldly conclusions,
Tocqueville afﬁrms a very different orientation to the here and now—to the
temporal and ﬁnite realm. He opens up the possibility that engagement with
the things of the world can amount to more than vanity and distraction.
Tocqueville’s statement that the Americans have “successfully blended . . . and
marvelously combined” the “spirit of religion” and the “spirit of liberty” is
indicative of a concern with providing an amelioration of the human con-
dition via a harmonization of the two aspects of human nature in the form
3. Citations fromDemocracy in America refer to the bilingual critical edition (Tocqueville
2010). Citations from The Old Regime and the Revolution refer to Alan Kahan’s translation
(Tocqueville 1998). Citations of Tocqueville’s letters are from Tocqueville (1985).
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of a “new political science” that redeems the political realm without diviniz-
ing it.
1. PASCAL ’S PREMISES
Nietzsche, no friend to Christians, wrote in a letter to his friend Georg Brandes
that Pascal was the “only logical Christian” and averred that he had learned
“an inﬁnite amount” from him (Nietzsche 1996, 327). Such testimony should
lead us to expect to ﬁnd a very powerful analysis of the human condition in
Pascal’s works, an analysis that forms the basis of his conclusion that the only
solution to humanity’s woes is supernatural and otherworldly and never to be
achieved by human action in this world. Yet, for all the clarity and logical
rigor we ﬁnd in his published papers, when we examine the Pensées, the work
where we ﬁnd Pascal’s observations and analysis of the human condition, we
encounter an unﬁnished work of cobbled-together fragments, whose pages
shine with brilliant observations but which sprawls out with no obvious order,
in apparently disorganized and contradictory array. Is there a deeper logic
here, or even a coherent conception of human life?
The reception of Pascal’s work (especially the history of responses to the
now-eponymous “Pascal’s Wager”) demonstrates the value of exercising pa-
tience on this point, for it is Nietzsche who appears to have had the more
accurate sense of the Pensées’ aphoristic fragments.4 Time has led to a sharper
and subtler understanding of what Pascal is up to. When Pascal’s writing ap-
pears obscure, one must be careful not to assume that the difﬁculty is in his
thought; instead, one must ﬁrst seek to uncover the logic behind it. Here I will
try to reconstruct the main lines of his conception of the human condition,
especially those aspects with which Tocqueville was most engaged. I will do
this ﬁrst by delineating a set of “premises” Pascal develops through close ob-
servation or analysis of human behavior and then, in the next section, by
turning to the conclusions that he draws from these premises.
The ﬁrst premise of Pascal’s argument is that the human desire for hap-
piness is universal. As he puts it, “[man] wants to be happy, he only wants to
be happy, and cannot not want to be happy” (frag. 166), and “[happiness] is
the motive for men’s every action, even those who are going to hang them-
selves” (frag. 181).
4. See Hacking (2006) for a good example of how the development of probability theory,
on the one hand, and a better understanding of Pascal’s manuscript, on the other, have led
scholars to a much subtler appreciation of the precise nature and function of Pascal’s Wager.
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1. All human beings necessarily wish to be happy, and all other desires
are subordinate to this wish.
This is our dearest desire; nonetheless, we suffer from a deep lack of clarity
regarding the nature of happiness. Happiness consists in peace or rest, while
we consistently seek it out through activity (frag. 166). We do not understand
happiness well because we intuitively or subconsciously recognize that our
condition makes its achievement impossible. When happiness is impossible,
our happiness is best served if we avoid dwelling on its impossibility, because
doing so would make us even worse off and more miserable than before: “men
have decided for their own happiness not to think about it” (frag. 166).
Tocqueville agrees that we all desire happiness, although he does not es-
pouse the very strong, rather “classical” description of this desire expressed in
Pascal’s premise. He appears to hold a weaker version of the premise instead.
In Democracy in America Tocqueville states that “personal interest” is the
“only ﬁxed point in the human heart” (1.2.6, Tocqueville 2010, 391), and
elsewhere he says that all human beings possess an “ardent passion” for hap-
piness (Tocqueville 1985, 63), but he also denies that all our actions are per-
formed for the sake of self-interest (2.2.8, Tocqueville 2010, 921). “Interest” is
not quite what Pascal means by “happiness,” but we can settle here by saying
that Tocqueville agrees at least that we all pursue happiness and desire it. He
also agrees that happiness is not truly possible (Tocqueville 1985, 63).
Now, why does Pascal think that our happiness is so elusive, and so poorly
understood? Pascal is an antisystematic thinker. He distrusts the vanity in-
volved in system building, which serves the pride of the philosopher (frag. 175).
Human nature consists of “two different natures” (frag. 144), both “instinct”
and “reason,” “passion” and “thought,” “greatness” and “baseness,” the “an-
gel” and the “brute,” combined in a confused mixture we cannot comprehend
(frags. 164 and 230). It is dangerous to understand only one of these: we must
understand both our “greatness” and our “baseness” to think and live as we
ought (frags. 153 and 513). Yet philosophers for the most part have tried to
reduce human beings into one of these alternatives: “Some wanted to renounce
the passions and become gods, the others wanted to renounce reason and be-
come brute beasts. But neither group succeeded” (frag. 29; see also Dreyfus
2012). From the Platonists, Stoics, and Epicureans of antiquity down to Des-
cartes and Hobbes in Pascal’s own time, philosophers were guilty again and
again of oversimplifying the mixture that is humanity in order to render it more
theoretically tidy and uniﬁed. They unknowingly agree with Dostoevsky’s
Dmitry Karamazov that human nature is “much too prodigious” and should be
“cut down to size” (Dostoevsky 1994, 136).
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Pascal refuses either simpliﬁcation; human nature contains both “base-
ness” and “greatness,” andwe are thoroughly contradictory (frag. 230). Thus,
2. All human beings are a mixture of a rational nature and an animal
nature, each with its own principles.
He also denies that we can, or should aim to, become wholly one or the other.
We can never escape the needs or properties associated with the half we try
to suppress, and the attempt to do so only corrupts the aspect we pursue: “Man
is neither angel nor brute, and the unfortunate thing is that he who would act
the angel acts the brute” (frag. 358). Human happiness requires that both sides
of our nature be fulﬁlled, not just one or the other. We fail at achieving hap-
piness when either the brute’s or the angel’s desires are denied (frags. 110 and
166) or when the war between these two aspects prevents us from ﬁnding any
repose (frags. 29 and 168).
3. Human happiness requires fulﬁlling both our rational and our animal
nature and harmonizing these with each other.
Tocqueville not only accepts premise 2, the mixture principle, but adopts
Pascal’s language as well, referring to humanity as being divided between the
“angel” and the “brute” (2.2.16, Tocqueville 2010, 963). Tocqueville further
accepts that each of these elements has its own distinct needs and desires
(2.2.12, Tocqueville 2010, 940; 2.2.15, Tocqueville 2010, 956). Thus, Tocque-
ville also accepts premise 3. It is unhealthy for humanity to live too much as
angels or as brutes. Tocqueville noted that the colonists in the West Indies
succumbed to the temptations of bestiality and suffered for it (1.1.1, Tocque-
ville 2010, 38), but he also pointed out that those who live too much within
the realm of thought also suffer for it (2.1.10, Tocqueville 2010, 781–82),
tacitly chiding Pascal for failing to live by his own principles. The wish to sat-
isfy only the angel or only the brute is a self-destructive urge that legislators
ought to combat (2.2.15, Tocqueville 2010, 956). One also thinks of his mixed
judgment on the leading ﬁgures of the French Revolution, those extraordi-
nary ﬁgures who understood the theory of politics much more than they un-
derstood true statesmanship,who excelledmore in“genius” and in“conceiving
vast plans” than in “common sense” and the achievement of “great tasks”—
and who consequently fell short of “true glory” (The Old Regime and the
Revolution 1.3.8, Tocqueville 1998, 246).
Unfortunately, we are incapable of fulﬁlling the desires of either aspect of
human nature. The rational aspect of our nature desires to know the truth but
is trapped between ignorance and knowledge (frag. 230). We cannot help
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wanting to know the truth about human existence, but its accomplishment is
impossible (frag. 110). Human reason is calculative, moving from premises to
conclusions, and perfect in itself when its method is sound (Pascal 1995, 196–
97), but incapable of securing its ﬁrst premises, which it acquires from “na-
ture” (Pascal 1995, 194). What we regard as nature, however, is subject to
custom and frequently misleads us (frag. 164). It is subject to the “uncertain
balance between truth and pleasure . . . in the deepest interior of a human
being,” in such a way and to such a degree that a person rarely knows which
he or she is following (Pascal 1995, 195). The attempt to use our ﬁnite intellect
in order to comprehend an inﬁnitely great and inﬁnitely divisible universe
disorients our reason, which requires a resting point (frag. 230). For Pascal,
human science necessarily includes a “void” within it, “at its foundation”
(Khalfa 2003, 133). Moral knowledge is incomparably more important to
us than scientiﬁc knowledge (frag. 57), but the difﬁculty, or impossibility, of
knowing ourselves or our true nature makes it even more elusive (frags. 230
and 576). We are unsure even of how far our ignorance goes, because nei-
ther skepticism nor dogmatism can be established (frag. 164). The lack of a
ﬁxed point leaves us with the realization that for all reason can show us,
every aspect of human life is contingent and accidental. The kind of cos-
mic order that the philosophers have sought, which would give us a clear
sense of human identity and purpose, is entirely absent; the universe is “silent”
(frag. 229).
Can one live well by embracing the brute? Pascal does not take this option
seriously, or perhaps does not take himself to be addressing those who would
seriously consider pursuing a life like this. We cannot eliminate the angel, the
rational aspect of human nature, but we can make it serve the brute by de-
voting it to searching out the means for securing the brute’s desires and ex-
istence. In Tocqueville’s phrase, the angel is capable of teaching the brute and
showing it how to meet its needs, even to the point of constructing a sort of
morality that secures our brutish desires. Even in this role, the rational side of
human nature shows its greatness (frag. 138). But the rational aspect of human
nature distorts the brute’s simple desires: the interaction of the rational and
animal aspects of humanity produces the imagination, which renders the de-
sires of the brute fantastical, unlimited, and incapable of satisfaction (frag. 78).
Furthermore, reason reveals to the brute that we must die. Death undermines
contentment, for it is the most inescapable of our ills and our knowledge of its
inescapable and unpredictable arrival is itself an enormous evil (frag. 681).
Knowledge of death is so miserable that we require constant diversion or dis-
traction to escape from its misery (frag. 166).
Furthermore, the desires rooted in the two aspects of our nature conﬂict
with each other (frag. 514). They draw us in different directions and require
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different things of us; the difﬁculty of reconciling them is what has led phi-
losophers to their inaccurate simpliﬁcations of human nature (frag. 29). The
two aspects of ourselves do not ﬁt together well; taken as a whole, man is a
monstrous, incomprehensible being (frags. 163 and 164). Pascal therefore
concludes,
4. We are incapable of fulﬁlling or even harmonizing the desires natural
to human nature.
Tocqueville largely accepts premise 4. He understands mortality as an evil
we innately desire to escape, which impinges especially on our desire for ma-
terial things and therefore conﬂicts with the desires of the “brute” (1.2.9,
Tocqueville 2010, 482). He is aware of the power of general ideas but is also
aware of the cost associated with them (2.1.3, Tocqueville 2010, 727). He
believes that we are incapable of achieving either happiness or knowledge;
Tocqueville says that we have an innate desire to engage in “the search for
absolute, demonstrable truth,” but pursuing this “impossible” quest succeeded
only in throwing him into “a horrible state,” “the unhappiest time of his life.”
The “inextricable doubts” he encountered so disoriented him that he felt “the
ﬂoor tremble under his feet” and saw “the walls that surround him move.”
Despite our immense desire to know and to understand our own existence, our
lack of certainty regarding “the immense majority of points that it is important
for us to know” is “one of the most inﬂexible laws of our nature” (Tocqueville
1985, 64). Fundamentally, we do not understand our place in the universe or
the signiﬁcance of our existence; we experience our lives as contingent, and our
reason is sufﬁciently weak that we cannot live without dogmatic beliefs (2.1.2,
Tocqueville 2010, 712–15). Pure thought is too difﬁcult for us.
Human beings therefore occupy an unpleasant position. Can they ame-
liorate or, better, correct this condition? Can the being nature left in painful
perplexity overcome its condition by its own efforts at reform and enlight-
enment?
Pascal’s answer is a ﬁrm “No”: the causes of human misery escape human
control. Our misery is matched by our weakness. The nature of our ignorance
is itself a cause of our remaining in ignorance; our ignorance is not simple,
so that our ignorance of a moral standard itself prevents us from identifying
the moral standard. “We need a rule” to determine which starting point to
begin from, but “reason is pliable in either direction,” and so “there is no rule”
(frag. 455). We have no power to overcome human mortality. And no one
has yet found a means of making the passions and reason live with each other,
nor is it clear how someone could.
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5. We lack the power to change the human condition so as to make it
possible to fulﬁll the desires natural to human nature or to harmonize
our two aspects.
The wretchedness of the human condition, combined with our powerlessness
to make it anything else, lies at the root of the great restlessness that marks
human nature. According to Pascal, our desire to be happy and our incapac-
ity to become so force us to continually engage in an absurd attempt to undo
what cannot be undone, the corruption of human nature. The only remedy
available requires turning to God for help, which is contrary to our passions.
Therefore, we “doggedly refuse to face our misery” (Kolakowski 1995, 133)
and seek distractions instead.
Does Tocqueville agree? In a pessimistic mood late in life, he remarks that
“this singular being we call man” has been “granted just enough enlighten-
ment to see the wretchedness of his condition but not enough to change it”
(letter to Bouchitte, January 8, 1858, as quoted in Lamberti 1989, 157). But
this is not his dominant mood, as we will see in a moment. First, however, let
us see the conclusions that Pascal draws from these premises.
2. PASCAL ’S CONCLUSIONS
Pascal, we sense, is not an optimist about the human condition. From his
premises he concludes,
C1. Human beings are necessarily wretched and miserable beings.
We are wretched because we lack happiness; this wretchedness is necessary
because we lack the power to seriously change the conditions that prevent our
happiness.
Where does this wretchedness come from? According to Pascal, we were
created with another nature but have fallen from that nature, and we now live
with the consequences of inheriting a corrupted form of humanity, “like a fruit
bred from a rotten seed” (Pascal 1995, 222). Our “unsatisﬁed desires for cer-
tainty, happiness, and rest” point us back to a state of perfection we have lost
(Lawler 1993, 76). According to Pascal, this is the only, or at least the best,
explanation for humanity as we ﬁnd it, and Christianity alone provides a phi-
losophy that makes sense of our contradictory nature (frag. 690).
C2. The reason why human beings are wretched and weak is that human
nature has been corrupted from its original form.
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It is natural to then ask, can we never escape or improve this condition?
Pascal’s answer is that we ourselves can never improve this condition (frag. 67);
it can, however, be improved by another—that is, by God. The natural means
at our disposal all fall short. However, supernatural grace, of the kind Pascal
experienced ﬁrsthand in “the night of ﬁre” and recorded in the “Memorial”
(Pascal 1995, 178), has the power to change human nature. In this life, the
change is partial, although Pascal argues that saints, even in this life, are happy
(frag. 389). But even saints remain weighted down with corruption until the
resurrection of the dead. A full cure and harmonization of human nature will
not be achieved until then.
Pascal, then, argues that only a transcendent power could cure the human
condition. Moreover, because our malady must be healed by grace and not by
us, there is nothing in the realm of action, within the near horizon, that can
ameliorate our condition. One can train the body, the “automaton,” so that it
is accustomed to the ways of grace, but without grace this offers little help
regarding the fundamental ills of human life. We can and should seek grace,
but we cannot “win” it or perform any action that would overcome these ills.
Thus,
C3. We are capable of no form of action that could cure or signiﬁ-
cantly ameliorate human wretchedness and weakness.
C4. Human wretchedness and weakness can therefore be cured only by
receiving supernatural grace from a transcendent source, that is,
God.
For Pascal, then, the human end is, in principle, unachievable by action and
received only by grace. His conclusions drain the political realm of its sig-
niﬁcance: rather than being a domain in which to manifest the human telos, its
primary signiﬁcance is instead to contain the sinful self-love of individuals,
which, each conﬂicting with every other, must be subjected to force in order
for any peace to exist at all (frags. 119 and 135). Even the classical authors,
according to Pascal, knew better than to ascribe any signiﬁcance to action
and politics. Their political theories were created “to provide rules for a
madhouse” and “connived with [rulers’] delusions in order to restrain their
madness to as mild a form as possible” (frag. 457). “The proper function of
power,” Pascal says, “is to protect” (frag. 650): it is not for the sake of the
human good, which lies beyond its power to achieve, seeing as it can end
neither ignorance, nor mortality, nor the deep conﬂict within our nature. The
“glory” of the political realm is nothing but the vain attempt to substitute
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another life, one lived in the eyes of others, for the unhappiness of our actual
life (frag. 707).
For Pascal, then, man is a being with instincts for action. He has drives that
point and prod him toward a certain set of goals, but he has been set loose
within an environment in which all of those goals are set at an inﬁnite distance.
Weak, corrupt, and ignorant, man’s one chance of gaining the human end
requires a transcendent power that could transport him beyond the limits of
his own horizon.
Pascal’s conception of the human condition can be summarized as follows:
1. All human beings necessarily wish to be happy, and all other desires
are subordinate to this wish.
2. All human beings are a mixture of a rational nature and an animal
nature, each with its own principles.
3. Human happiness requires fulﬁlling both our rational and our ani-
mal nature and harmonizing these with each other.
4. We are incapable of fulﬁlling or even harmonizing the desires natural
to human nature.
5. We lack the power to change the human condition so as to make it
possible to fulﬁll the desires natural to human nature or to harmonize
our two aspects.
From these premises, Pascal derives the following conclusions:
C1. Human beings are necessarily wretched and miserable beings.
C2. The reason why human beings are wretched and weak is that hu-
man nature has been corrupted from its original form.
C3. We are capable of no form of action that could cure or signiﬁcantly
ameliorate human wretchedness and weakness.
C4. Human wretchedness and weakness can therefore be cured only by
receiving supernatural grace from a transcendent source, that is, God.
3. THE MIXTURE THAT IS HUMAN NATURE:
TOCQUEVILLE ’S CRITIQUE OF PASCAL
Tocqueville agrees with Pascal in conceiving of human nature as a combina-
tion of two factors (premise 2) and in thinking that happiness requires har-
monizing these with each other (premise 3). He also accepts that we are not
happy (conclusion C1) but seems to think it better to be content without hap-
piness and to ﬁght our “foolish passion” for it (Tocqueville 1985, 63). In
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accepting these, he also makes a criticism of Pascal of far-reaching signiﬁ-
cance (2.1.10, Tocqueville 2010, 781–82): according to Tocqueville, Pascal
attempted to live too much in thought; his life was inhuman because it gave
too little place to “the brute.”Wemight be tempted to say that this criticism has
no theoretical signiﬁcance; after all, Tocqueville criticizes Pascal the man on
the basis of Pascal’s own principles. However, consider premise 5: does not
Pascal’s estimation of human power have great implications for how we think
of action, which is to say, to what kind of use we may put “the brute”? The
most obvious signiﬁcance of our animality, in contrast to our spirituality, is
embodiment: we have bodies and are therefore beings who do things in the
world; we are beings who act, not merely thinkers. But what sort of action
are we to engage in? Pascal’s conception of politics is deeply apolitical; only
private life seems to retain any true signiﬁcance (frag. 650). His view of hu-
man life encourages “individualism” (2.2.2, Tocqueville 2010, 881–84). Even in
the religious realm Pascal does not carve out a signiﬁcant role for action. The
fragments concerned with “Christian Morality” have surprisingly little to say
about the type of activities Christians should engage in, and Pascal devotes
remarkably little space to developing his potent metaphors of the Church as a
“republic” or as “a body of thinking members” (frag. 403). Similarly, the sac-
ramental practices he recommends unbelievers engage in (on the suppositions
that “faith is catching,” as Hacking [2006, 67] puts it, and that it is necessary
to give “belief” the “immediacy and authority of ‘sentiment’” [Moriarty 2003,
156]) help prepare the body—or, as he terms it here, “the machine”—to follow
the Christian way of life, but these practices are empty without grace, and
they do not manifest the “greatness” that marks thought. Although Pascal as-
serts that “we are as much automaton as mind” (frag. 661), his thought tilts
injudiciously far toward the spiritual factor.
One must be careful here. Pascal’s view is not, as some might take it, that
the soul is good and the body bad, but that humanity is subject to a double
duality of body (or automaton) and soul (or mind), on the one hand, and
nature and corruption, on the other. The mind or soul is the source of human
greatness but is not thereby identiﬁed with goodness. For Augustine, whom
Pascal follows closely in his theology, human corruption arises in the soul, in
the sin of pride, and not in the body. The corruption of the body is the pun-
ishment of the sin of the soul (Augustine 1998, 606). The duality of mind and
automaton is established in creation and would be as much a part of a perfect
humanity as a fallen one. Greatness is the exclusive prerogative of the mind, or
of thought. By comparison, the body is petty or base. As created, however,
both are good. As fallen, both are evil. Thus, he believes that wickedness can
manifest greatness, as when he says, “When wickedness has reason on its
side, it becomes proud, and shows off reason in all its lustre” (frag. 458). We
120 • American Political Thought • Winter 2016
are necessarily both mind and body, and thus for Pascal salvation does not
come through the mind, but through the heart (frag. 680).
Tocqueville treats these two dualities differently. Like Kierkegaard and
Dostoevsky, religious thinkers inﬂuenced by Pascal, he sought a form of activ-
ity in which the two aspects of human nature, soul and body, could be har-
monized and that would escape the charge of vanity. Unlike them, Tocqueville
is concerned speciﬁcally with redeeming the political realm and with identi-
fying a way that action might share in the “greatness” Pascal associated with
“thought” or the “angel.”According to Tocqueville, in the right conditions we
are “powerful and free” and capable of engaging in action that manifests
greatness in a way ruled out by Pascal’s understanding of our condition. Per-
haps we cannot cure the human condition; but if Tocqueville is correct, such
action allows us then to signiﬁcantly improve it. He is after a means not “to
transcend” but “to preserve and reform this life” (Lawler 1993, 82). He rejects
premise 5, at least as it stands.
This leads Tocqueville to make modiﬁcations elsewhere. Premise 4 is mod-
iﬁed as follows: the ultimate harmonization and correction of the human con-
dition is impossible in the temporal realm, but action manifesting the greatness
of thought does effect a partial improvement and harmonization. Tocque-
ville is silent concerning conclusion C2, inferring neither Pascal’s Christian
nor Rousseau’s historical version of the “corruption” claim. Thus, the second
duality disappears from view; he is less Augustinian than Pascal and less anti-
Augustinian than Rousseau. Tocqueville’s view of conclusion C4 seems to be
that if the human condition can be fundamentally transformed, it can be cured
only through such a means (1.2.9, Tocqueville 2010, 482). But his modiﬁca-
tion of premise 5 leads him into a direct confrontation with conclusion C3: ac-
tion cannot effect the kind of cure described in conclusion C4, in which the
ultimate fulﬁllment of human desires is envisioned and the distressing conﬂict of
angel and beast is completely overcome; it can, however, domuchmore to affect
our condition than Pascal believed, and it is in such action that Tocqueville
found the best cure for our restlessness and the fulﬁllment of our need for
harmony between angel and beast. It may be that conclusion C1 is not as sure as
it seems.
4. FREE ACTION AND ACTION
MANIFESTING GREATNESS
Alongside our deplorable ignorance, our mortality, and the perpetual dis-
turbance between the two conﬂicting aspects of human nature, then, we also
ﬁnd a fourth important part of the human condition: our capacity to engage in
a form of action realizing the greatness of thought. Such action, originating
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in the categories of thought rather than through the necessities of the body, is
a form of free action. Thus, for Tocqueville, human beings must be free to
manifest greatness; and unless we believe ourselves free, we will not become
the sort of people or engage in the sort of projects that manifest greatness.
Tocqueville’s category of action manifesting greatness can be understood
by examining some of his examples of it: an aristocrat’s extravagant vices
(2.2.11, Tocqueville 2010, 936); the making of magniﬁcent tombs (1.1.1,
Tocqueville 2010, 43); Renaissance painting (2.1.11, Tocqueville 2010, 795);
the American Pilgrims’ founding of a new colony where they would be free to
worship (1.1.2, Tocqueville 2010, 54); the actions of the American states-
man George Washington in the founding and in establishing the direction of
American foreign policy, a greatness most completely expressed in his resis-
tance to the exaggerations of popular passion (1.1.8, Tocqueville 2010, 190;
1.2.5, Tocqueville 2010, 371); and the actions of the French Revolutionary
generation during the ﬁrst stage of the Revolution (The Old Regime and the
Revolution 1.3.8, Tocqueville 1998, 244).
Like Aristotle, Tocqueville distinguishes greatness as a quality of action
from other qualities, such as goodness (Aristotle, Poetics 1450b25). Actions
manifesting greatness can be admired under that category despite being either
vicious or deeply problematic in other ways. Today we admire the Pyramids,
the Great Wall, and other monuments raised by despotic powers despite the
conditions under which they were created and even the ends they were meant
to serve; Tocqueville likewise distinguishes between the question whether an
action arose in thought and the question whether it arose from a thought that
was true or even good.
Let’s begin with Tocqueville’s famous statement that what set apart the
American Pilgrims who colonized New England was their aim: rather than
being “forced by necessity,” they had left behind relatively comfortable ma-
terial and social circumstances “to obey a purely intellectual need”; they suf-
fered the “deprivations of exile” and settled in a “rough and neglected” land
that required them to exert tremendous effort, all for “the triumph of an idea”
(1.1.2, Tocqueville 2010, 54). Tocqueville observes that the greatness of this
action has been enough to make Plymouth Rock, an insigniﬁcant boulder,
into an “object of veneration” (57). He concludes, echoing Pascal, by saying
that “the power and the greatness of man lie entirely in the soul” (57).
The main elements of Tocqueville’s conception of greatness-in-action ap-
pear here: (1) the action was not motivated by material necessity, or at least
not directly necessitated by instinct or by material needs; (2) the action orig-
inated “in the soul,” that is, in an idea or ideal that itself manifests greatness in
the form of virtue, wisdom, beauty, or something similar; and (3) it required
considerable effort and power or mastery to realize the idea in the world. Dif-
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ferent actions may display these qualities to varying degrees, but the most
impressive human achievements, from Tocqueville’s perspective, seem to need
all three qualities to a high degree. (And so he might have judged the Pyramids
of Giza more impressive than the Great Wall because they were not con-
structed to fulﬁll a natural necessity such as defense.)
The other paradigms of greatness-in-action cited by Tocqueville correspond
to the example of the Pilgrims, manifesting all three of these qualities as well.
In each case, the action does not aim at meeting a material need or natural
necessity. The construction of tombs, the production of ﬁne art, and the pur-
suit of “liberty, equality, and fraternity” do not ﬁll the stomach or clothe the
body. Further, each arises from an idea or ideal having its origin in thought.
Modern painters, such as Jacques-Louis David, are exact anatomists, but their
painting does not display greatness; they “copy small objects that have only
too many originals in nature.” Renaissance painters, on the contrary, “looked
above themselves” for “great subjects”; Raphael “sought something better
than nature” for his art, and rather thanmerely providing “an exact portrait of
man,” he “gave us a glimpse of divinity in his works” (2.1.11, Tocqueville
2010, 795). Finally, all these examples require great mastery to be achieved.
None could be executed without overcoming signiﬁcant difﬁculties and with-
out showing extraordinary character and personal qualities, above all, dis-
playing mastery—a mastery of the material environment that allows the ac-
tor or actors to bridge the gap between the realm of thought, where the idea
or ideal arose, and the realm of the body, where this idea is now to be real-
ized and achieved. As Pascal wrote, “only mastery and control create glory”
(frag. 648).
Actions manifesting greatness are, like humanity itself, mixed. Their pe-
culiar mixture can be understood by comparison with two different sorts of
mixed actions. Tocqueville considers the Pilgrims’ actions to have manifested
greatness. Their lofty goal was reinforced by the nature of the efforts required
in colonizing New England: the difﬁculty of settling in the rough landscape,
the requirement that life must struggle with death, meant that the settlers’
efforts to meet their material needs always required the soul’s involvement as
well. They constantly had to develop and exercise virtues and qualities be-
longing to the soul in order to successfully transform their surroundings into a
livable environment. Thus, not only did they set out with the object of real-
izing an idea, but even their material needs served to reinforce their “soulish”
orientation, while preventing them from becoming as excessively soulish as
Pascal, with whom they shared theological kinship.
But if the Pilgrims were so challenged by their environment as to require the
constant development and use of the powers of the soul by natural necessity,
as it were, the Americans of Tocqueville’s time presented a different aspect.
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They too were engaged in constant practical activity—the unending pursuit of
greater wealth. But what was the end of this pursuit? What pressure led to this
constant activity, if the natural environment was no longer so threatening?
The American social state is democratic, which is to say, it is marked by
widespread socioeconomic equality: society is ﬁlled with many weak indi-
viduals whose fortunes vary constantly rather than a few classes whose power
remains constant from generation to generation. Thus, material goods are
available to anyone, but only with effort, and these are never secure. This
uncertainty and the general enjoyment of “mediocre fortunes,” coupled with
the “natural and instinctive taste” for material well-being, produce desire and
fear: desire to possess greater material wealth and the fear of losing what one
has (2.2.10, Tocqueville 2010, 931, 933). This gives the passion for material
gain a particularly powerful grasp on the soul (931).
Restlessness, however, is not the effect simply of the uncertainty attached to
Americans’ material possessions. Americans’ devotion to material well-being
starves the soul, so that its needs are not met (2.2.12, Tocqueville 2010, 940).
The pursuit of material wealth may “distract it from itself” but cannot prevent
it from becoming “bored, restless, and agitated” (940). In a few individuals,
this leads to the formation of “bizarre sects” and “religious madness” (940);
in these instances, the angel strives to break free from the brute altogether and,
not knowing itself or its limits, runs “beyond the limits of common sense”
(941).
The starving of the soul produces other effects in the greater population.
“The man who has conﬁned his heart solely to the goods of this world”
(2.2.13, Tocqueville 2010, 944) is driven into a kind of irrationality. Knowing
that he has only “a limited time” (944) to enjoy goods “so precious, so in-
complete, and so ﬂeeting” (2.2.10, Tocqueville 2010, 933), he is “goaded” by
the knowledge that life is running out and that death will cut short his en-
joyment of these transient goods (2.2.13, Tocqueville 2010, 944): “at every
instant he is afraid of ceasing to live before enjoying them” (943). In fact,
despite the American’s vaunted philosophy of “interest well-understood,” he
seems to regularly miscalculate: despite constant anxiety about spending
more effort in obtaining a good than its enjoyment is worth (945), he is caught
up in “useless pursuit” that does not end in the enjoyment of his goods, or in
“felicity,” but in the intervention of “death” (944). For the average individual
in a democratic society, then, the starving of the soul produces a kind of
heightened material activity that is driven on by the fear of death—not of
death per se, but of death’s curtailing of enjoyment—which is, when strictly
examined, irrational in itself and productive of “melancholy” and “disgust
with life” (946).
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What is the difference between these cases? In both, the American is put to
constant labor to achieve the needs of the body; yet in one, this yields the
improvement of the powers of the soul, and in the other, their impoverishment.
The early Americans, we note, enjoyed a more aristocratic social state, the
later Americans a more democratic one; religion and the conviction that hu-
manity includes “a non-material and immortal principle” were more natural
to the former than the latter (2.2.15, Tocqueville 2010, 958). Such convictions
must be “protected carefully as the most precious heritage of aristocratic
centuries” (958), and this is why Tocqueville shortly argues that democratic
legislators must, to the greatest extent possible, strive to inculcate “the taste
for the inﬁnite, the sentiment of the grand, and the love for non-material
pleasures” (957). The lofty and austere character of a Washington presents
such an example, but the conditions necessary for preparing such individuals
have dwindled in subsequent generations. The early Americans, the Pilgrims,
had an ultimate goal rooted in the soul: the establishment of an idea. The
more they had to strive with their environment to realize this idea, the more
it supported their endeavor by strengthening their character. But for the later
Americans, these ends appear insigniﬁcant, and their constant pursuit of ma-
terial goods drowns the soul in narrow and petty concerns.
One should not miss the very Pascalian use that Tocqueville makes of the
fear of death here. That fear is closely associated with the pursuit of material
goods, which, by their nature, can be enjoyed only in this life. The Americans
Tocqueville describes seem trapped in a vicious cycle: the more they pursue
these goods, the more uneasiness they experience and the more frantically they
need to pursue the goods, precisely because of the latter’s instability and
transitory nature, so that ﬁnally the Americans live entirely in their pursuit
and, to the extent that they enjoy what they possess, seem to do so by accident.
They are actively increasing the discordance between the two elements of hu-
man nature in themselves and intensifying the ills of the human condition by
increasing the fearfulness of death.
This explains Tocqueville’s severe language regarding those who teach ma-
terialism. Because materialism encourages, and would even justify, Americans
in this behavior, we should “consider the men who profess [these harmful
theories] as the natural enemies of the people” (2.2.15, Tocqueville 2010, 957).
We cannot know the answers to the ultimate questions, such as whether ma-
terialism is true, but Tocqueville thinks that we can and do know what the
results are of following that doctrine. Because Tocqueville’s adherence to sev-
eral key features of Pascal’s conception of the human condition is often not
apparent, his condemnation of materialism can surprise the reader. Tocque-
ville sees the propagation of materialism as increasing the inherent misery of
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the human condition and driving us away from what is “great” and worth-
while in human life.
Since a democratic social state is conducive to materialism and hostile to
belief in any kind of spiritual reality, the fate of democratic peoples—their
ability to respond appropriately to the human condition and to engage in
activities manifesting greatness—appears to hinge on whether they can pre-
serve their sources of spiritual belief. This is why Tocqueville recommends
that democratic legislators pay careful attention to the preservation of reli-
gion: “it is when religion is not speaking about liberty that it best teaches
Americans the art of being free” (1.2.9, Tocqueville 2010, 472), he says, and
we must combine this with his statement that “it is necessary that all those
who are interested in the future of democratic societies unite, and that all in
concert make continual efforts to spread within these societies the taste for the
inﬁnite, the sentiment for the grand and the love for non-material pleasures”
(2.2.15, Tocqueville 2010, 957). This is achieved, above all, by combating
materialism and preserving any “belief in a non-material and immortal prin-
ciple” (958). We must preserve the possibility of action like that undertaken
by the Pilgrims, rather than limiting ourselves to the pursuit of materialistic
consumption.
We are now in a position to better understand why greatness-in-action
forms Tocqueville’s great exception to Pascal’s picture. He believes that ac-
tions and activities that manifest greatness somehow ameliorate our condi-
tion. But why?
5. THE AMELIORATIVE POWER OF
GREATNESS-IN-ACTION
Tocqueville agrees with Pascal that our existence is marked by severe ills and
that we are unable to fundamentally transform our condition to avoid them.
However, he parts from Pascal in believing that there are ways of signiﬁcantly
improving our condition, through engaging in action that manifests greatness.
The question is, why believe that engaging in such action alters our condition?
Tocqueville never wears his theories on his sleeve. This is why his philo-
sophical sophistication has been so underestimated (as noted, e.g., in Lawler
1993, 98); he leaves the work of excavation and reconstruction to his reader.
Let us, then, put things together. The body has needs and desires intrinsic to it;
the soul also has its needs and desires. In pursuing material goods we generally
serve the body; in pursuing spiritual goods we serve the soul. When the soul is
starved in the pursuit of material goods, its uneasiness gives a frantic character
to the pursuit of material well-being. On the other hand, the body is neglected
for the pursuit of pure spiritual goods. The body suffers, and a Pascal wears
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out his body too soon, so that he dies “of old age before reaching forty years of
age” (2.1.10, Tocqueville 2010, 782). But there are activities in which the two
of these come together and, to some extent, harmonize with one another:
activities arising in the soul, in a great idea or ideal of some kind, and achieved
through mastery exercised in the material realm. These aim at a goal that
combines physical and spiritual qualities and, in their greatness, achieve a
lasting existence that endures beyond the life of the actor. Those who engage
in these activities also acquire a kind of knowledge—not the knowledge that
consists of abstract, general concepts, of which Tocqueville is so dismissive,
and not the knowledge of those ultimate truths that Tocqueville despaired of
ever ﬁnding, but a knowledge rooted in things and in action, a knowledge that
is both precise and practical and related to matters of importance.
Let’s begin with the question of harmonizing the two aspects of human
nature. What is it about activities manifesting greatness that brings the ele-
ments of human nature together? It is not that activities manifesting great-
ness manage to meet both types of needs at once: painting a great masterpiece
is no means to care for the body. Very few activities manifesting greatness
would have the accidental quality of also caring for the body’s needs. Con-
structing a great work of architecture or founding a republic that will endure
the ages might be actions of this type: although aiming to realize an idea, they
also do something for the body. But this is not generally the case, and Tocque-
ville attaches little importance to such coincidences, so we need to consider a
different sort of harmonizing that occurs in these activities.
Greatness-in-action harmonizes the soul and the body, the spiritual and
physical aspects of ourselves, by embodying an idea or making the ideal real,
through the use of the body. Accomplishing this task requires great mastery
of the physical realm in which the work is to be accomplished—a practical,
embodied knowledge of the material realm in which the idea is to be realized.
Exercising this mastery is an affair of the body, involving it in the constant
pursuit of the ideal put before it by the soul. In pursuing this ideal, the body is
ennobled and participates in greatness insofar as it realizes the achievement of
its sublime goal, whereas the body is despised and negated by philosophers
and contemplatives who seek greatness in pursuing answers to the eternal
questions, in contemplation, or in other purely spiritual activities, so that it is
ﬁnally “worn out” by someone like Pascal who accomplishes this too com-
pletely. In the effort to embody the ideal, the body is an active participant that,
through the exercise of mastery, is constantly harmonized with the soul in the
activity of embodiment. In these activities we are whole.
Soul and body are therefore harmonized in the activity itself in which each
pursues the same end. But does such activity really do nothing to satisfy the
needs and desires of our bodily aspect, except by accident? The most funda-
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mental of the body’s needs is the instinctive aversion to death; it is this in-
stinct that is, ironically, frustrated the most when a person is wholly devoted
to pursuing material goods, since these are only good in being enjoyed, and
enjoyment ends when the body dies and can only begin when pursuit ceases.
The stationary peasant gets more enjoyment from the little he has than the
restless American who devotes himself to always obtaining more (2.2.13,
Tocqueville 2010, 942–43). Not only the activity itself, but also the result of
greatness-in-action ameliorates the human condition by leaving behind either
a great product or the memory of something great. When someone embodies
the ideal in something that exists here and now, in some monument, or in-
stitution, or event that will be remembered, the person leaves behind some-
thing that will endure beyond death. Tocqueville agrees with Pascal that
ultimately we lack the power to overcome death, remarking that, “of all the
works of man, the most durable is still the one that best recounts his noth-
ingness and woes!”—that is, the tombs that we build for the dead, which
sometimes endure long beyond the memory of the people who made them
(1.1.1, Tocqueville 2010, 43). The power to abolish death transcends human
capacities. Within the circumscribed horizon of what lies within our power,
however, it is possible to achieve something signiﬁcant and worthwhile that
will endure beyond us, an aspect of glory that escaped Pascal.
In such action we also escape the fundamental ignorance that marks our
condition. We resort to general ideas in our inability to properly grasp and
understand “the immensity of details” involved in attempting “to examine
and to judge individually all the particular cases” connected to a topic (2.1.3,
Tocqueville 2010, 726). Our “imperfect, but necessary procedure” is to give
similar cases the same name, and therefore to treat distinct but analogous
beings, facts, and rules as if they were exactly the same (727). But when it
comes to action, the matter is different; when it comes to what people deal
with “everyday” and “in a practical way,” they must “enter into details” and
acquire a very “deep knowledge” and “inﬁnite skill” (2.1.4, Tocqueville 2010,
739; 1.2.11, Tocqueville 2010, 174). This obtains great signiﬁcance when it
comes to political matters: a people that “has only been able to think about
the best way to conduct politics” will necessarily be very poor at it (2.1.4,
Tocqueville 2010, 738). One that “has always run public affairs by them-
selves” will, on the contrary, not be overly taken up by theories that only
approximate reality (The Old Regime and the Revolution 1.3.1, Tocqueville
1998, 201; Democracy in America 2.1.4, Tocqueville 2010, 739). Such a
people will instead have a grasp of the elements of politics rooted in experience
with the matter itself.
Can such knowledge compensate for our ignorance of fundamental prin-
ciples? To be sure, it is hard to see how a ﬁne and exact knowledge of wheat
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prices would do so, but should we say the same of the knowledge related to
greatness-in-action? If statesmanship, for example, manifests greatness in it,
then must we not attribute added importance to knowledge related to states-
manship, above all to the kind that is well acquainted with action itself, and
not just the theoretical knowledge of it that Tocqueville criticized Diderot
for (The Old Regime and the Revolution 1.3.2, Tocqueville 1998, 206)? And
likewise to the knowledge related to these other kinds of action that manifest
greatness? Since we know best what we are most frequently and actively
engaged with, this knowledge will not suffer from the looseness and falsify-
ing abstraction that afﬂicts so much of our theoretical knowledge; and since
it relates to something that is great, sublime, or otherwise signiﬁcant, this
knowledge will not be something petty. Just as the endurance of greatness-in-
action falls short of immortality but greatly exceeds that of purely material
goods, so too the knowledge of matters related to greatness-in-action falls short
of the knowledge of ﬁrst principles we desire but cannot have, but it greatly
exceeds the other kinds of knowledge we can obtain—it exceeds our theoretical
knowledge by being true and more precise, and it exceeds our other practical
knowledge by relating to matters with greater signiﬁcance and importance.
In this way, then, we can see how Tocqueville could conclude that engag-
ing in action that manifests greatness can indeed ameliorate the human con-
dition. Such action strikes at each of the particular woes associated with our
condition and, although not completely victorious in vanquishing them, es-
tablishes a rampart against them and secures a place within which human be-
ings can become more whole and, to some extent, triumphant over our igno-
rance and mortality.
It also helps us to understand why we should regard liberty as particularly
important—and why liberty cannot be identiﬁed either with simply providing
individuals with security in their private pursuits (as Aron [1965, 190] mis-
takenly concludes) or with the collective actions of a large mass of individuals.
Liberty as Tocqueville understands it secures the possibility of individuals
freely coming together in action (see Boesche 1987, 154–55). Some kinds of
greatness-in-action can be achieved by a single individual or by a few friends.
Great goals, however, frequently require the cooperation of many individuals
acting together. Liberty as Tocqueville understands it—a liberty that provides
individuals with institutional and social contexts in which to freely initiate and
freely participate in action together with others—does not guarantee that it
will be used for the sake of great and signiﬁcant goals. Such liberty is, how-
ever, frequently one of its necessary conditions. A liberty that secures only the
pursuit of individual interests, or a liberty that only allows individuals to come
together for the sake of electing a national leader, would never sufﬁce to secure
this possibility for individuals. Besides threatening to produce conditions fa-
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vorable to tyranny, such arrangements are objectionable in that each throws
individuals back upon themselves and divorces them from a context in which
they could participate in action that manifests greatness, so that they “[fall]
gradually below the level of humanity” (2.4.6, Tocqueville 2010, 1259).
Without denying Pascal’s transcendent ultimate solution to the ills of hu-
man existence, then, Tocqueville provides a this-worldly response to our con-
dition, a way of confronting it in the here and now. His political solution is
imperfect; politics is still partially a diversion (Lawler 1993, 118). In a certain
way, tombs, which testify to our “nothingness,” are a symbol for all types of
greatness-in-action. Nonetheless, if Tocqueville is correct, then we may cede
much to Pascal without ceding all. It may be true that humanity is afﬂicted by
signiﬁcant, even crippling, ills of ignorance, mortality, and disorder, and that
the only cure for these lies at an inﬁnite distance from us, beyond peaks we
can never scale and a transcendent horizon we can never cross. But within the
domain that is within our power there are palliatives available and modes of
existence that manifest some of the grandeur that Pascal argued was lost in
Adam, including liberty and political action—not beyond the unclimbable
peaks but among the foothills whose ascent is, sometimes, within our power.
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